Negotiating with Terrorists: The Way Forward
Twenty-third in my series Negotiating with Tyrants
With the surprise attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, 2023, I thought it appropriate to post several articles about negotiating with terrorists. (Please know, I have never negotiated with a terrorist although I have negotiated with people who have terrorized me.)
There is considerable debate around the topic of negotiating with terrorists. It is not my intention to come down on the pro or con side of the argument. As a student of negotiating, it is merely my intent to study and present both sides of this argument. You, the reader, have the responsibility to reach your own conclusion. I must admit, there are valid points for each position.
Today’s post is from an article that appeared in the U.S. Army War College Review in February 2016. The author, Craig Simonsgaard, argues the point that the U.S. should reverse its stated policy of not negotiating with terrorists.
The United States policy of not negotiating with terrorists fails to serve American security interests. By refusing to negotiate, the U.S. effectively secures the fate of the hostage(s) and terrorist(s), prevents all possibilities of finding a diplomatic solution, denies the U.S. an opportunity to gather information via negotiation, and, in essence, serves to justify terrorist executions for both terrorists and their supporters. Denying even the possibility of negotiation not only serves the terrorists’ ends by making their actions appear all the more just in the face of U.S. absolutism, but it also unnecessarily and severely limits U.S. options. In short, the U.S. should end its absolutist, no-negotiation policy and be open to negotiating with terrorists when doing so would benefit U.S. interests.
The United States has negotiated formally and informally with the Soviets, the Cubans, and the North Vietnamese, (the North Koreans); none of them were playing by democratic rules and all of them used force (or threat of force to gain political advantage.
Even if terrorism is not regularly successful, it would still be cheaper in the long run to avoid conflict. Avoiding conflict is nearly impossible without at least some avenue for negotiation.
The benefits of ending the U.S. non-negotiation policy far outweigh the largely fallacious reasons for maintaining the hardline. First, reversing the policy would allow the U.S. government to pursue a diplomatic solution without having to violate its own no-negotiation policy. When news broke of the Sergeant Begdahl trade, for example, the media was filled with rhetoric chastising the (Obama Biden) administration for “violating its own rules” without regard for the value of executing the deal. A more flexible policy would have far more strategic consistency and allow political leaders to pursue the most appropriate options in each particular circumstance. The Second reason is that negotiation can benefit the U.S. when further conflict is likely and possibly inevitable. Even if negotiations fail, the U.S. might gain valuable intelligence about adversaries through the negotiation process. Negotiation-based intelligence gathering not only includes gaining organizational information like personal connections and chain of command but also generates a better understanding of the true interests of terrorist leaders who may say one thing to constituents but have different personal or organizational objectives. Knowing as much as possible about an adversary is essential. Negotiation can be helpful in that regard. Third, when appropriate, offering to negotiate could show U.S. commitment to problem-solving. Even if terrorist leaders reject an offer to talk, the very act of negotiation willingness by U.S. authorities could signal to terrorist supporters that their leaders prefer violence over negotiation. In short, a willingness to negotiate could potentially lead to the start or widening of a rift between terrorist leaders and followers.
Recognizing the high cost of giving concessions to terrorists may seem like encouraging future attacks, Fisher, Ury, and Patton suggest that: “through communication it may be possible to convince terrorists (and possible future terrorists) they will not receive a ransom (or whatever concession they are trying to achieve). It may also be possible to learn of some legitimate interests they have and work out an arrangement in which neither side gives in.” (Note 1)
More convincing is their simple, almost obvious point, that “In general, the better the communication the better your chance to exert influence.” (Note 2). The no-negotiation policy curtails in significant ways the opportunity for the U.S. to display leadership while exerting influence.
Clearly, negotiation is not a cure-all for dealing with terrorism. With or without negotiation, the way ahead will be fraught with difficulties and hard choices. Although communication will never overcome “insurmountable differences,” “without open channels of communication, opportunities to explore common interests may be missed.” (Note 3)
Notes:
(Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes, New York, Penguin Books, 2011, 163-164).
Ibid, 163
(Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Challenges in International Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991, 158).
Source: Negotiating with Terrorists: The Way Forward, Craig Simmonsgaard, Army War College Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Feb. 2016, 45 - 48.
NO PART OF THIS ARTICLE WAS CREATED WITH ANY AI TOOLS